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President Obama’s Legacy: The 
Iran Nuclear Agreement? 
Milena Sterio* 
Iran, the United States, and several world super-powers 
signed a historic nuclear agreement over the summer of 2015. 
The Agreement is a comprehensive plan of action, with an 
unprecedented level of minutia and detail regarding Iran’s 
commitment to curb its nuclear program in exchange for the 
lifting of United Nations-imposed sanctions against Iran. This 
Agreement, if it is successfully implemented, may represent 
President Obama’s most significant foreign policy achievement 
and may become the most important element of President 
Obama’s legacy. This Article will examine the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement by focusing on the events which led to the imposition 
of sanctions against Iran and to the ultimate negotiation of this 
Agreement, the structure of the Agreement; this Article will also 
discuss the most significant advantages and disadvantages of this 
somewhat risky deal. This Article will conclude that the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement could become one of President Obama’s 
biggest foreign policy accomplishments in the Middle East. 
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I. Introduction 
Iran and several world super-powers, including the United States, 
signed a historic nuclear agreement over the summer of 2015. The 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [hereinafter “Agreement”] was 
signed on July 14, 2015 in Vienna by the United States, Great 
 
* The Charles R. Emrick Jr. – Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law 
and Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law. The author would like to thank the Frederick K. Cox 
International Law Center at Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, and in particular, the organizers of this conference, New 
Beginnings, Resets and Pivots: The International Legal Practice of the 
Obama Administration – ILW/Midwest 2015, for the opportunity to 
present these remarks.  
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Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, the European Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran.1 It is 
over one hundred pages long and has five annexes; some 
commentators have indicated that the level of minutia and detail in 
this agreement is unprecedented in terms of other nuclear non-
proliferation agreements throughout history.2 Under the terms of the 
Agreement, Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in exchange for 
the lifting of United Nations-imposed sanctions against Iran.3 The 
Agreement, if successfully implemented, may represent one of 
President Obama’s most significant foreign policy achievements and 
may become a cornerstone of Obama’s legacy. This Article will 
examine the Iran Nuclear Agreement by focusing on the events which 
led to the imposition of sanctions against Iran and to the ultimate 
negotiation of this Agreement (II), the structure of the Agreement 
(III), and will discuss the most significant advantages and 
disadvantages of this somewhat risky deal (IV). This Article will 
conclude that the Iran Nuclear Agreement could become one of 
President Obama’s biggest accomplishments regarding foreign policy 
(V). 
II. Prelude: What Lead to the Agreement? 
Iran signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty 
(NPT) in 1968 as a non-nuclear weapons state and ratified the NPT 
in 1970.4 However, in the 1970s even as a member of the NPT, Iran 
began developing nuclear technology when the United States’ Atoms 
for Peace program began providing assistance to Iran, led by the 
American-supported Shah.5  
 
1. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 
2015), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9DBJ-XEX4].  
2. See John Mecklin, The Experts Assess the Iran Agreement of 2015, 
BULLETIN ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (July 14, 2015, 2:31 AM), available 
at http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 
[http://perma.cc/Y7TX-5PSV] (including commentary from Lawrence 
Korb and Katherine Blakely of the Center for American Progress, 
stating that the Iran nuclear deal “was one of the most comprehensive 
and detailed nuclear arms agreements ever reached.”). 
3. Eyder Peralta, 6 Things You Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal, 
NPR (July 14, 2015, 3:05 PM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422920192/6-
things-you-should-know-about-the-iran-nuclear-deal 
[http://perma.cc/8SF4-NSBG]. 
4. Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ 
[http://perma.cc/2V97-G4DV] (last visited Oct. 2015). 
5. Id. 
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Iran’s nuclear program was temporarily halted starting in 1979, 
when the Iranian Revolution took place, and much of Iran’s nuclear 
talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution.6 The nuclear 
program continued to be suspended after the Revolution, because the 
new Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was initially 
opposed to nuclear technology, and because Iran was engaged in a 
costly war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, which effectively disabled 
Iran from pursuing any type of nuclear technology.7  
In the late 1980s, Iran revived its nuclear weapon program, with 
assistance from Pakistan, China, and Russia. Pakistan entered into a 
bilateral agreement with Iran in 1992, China in 1990, and Russia in 
1992 and 1995.8 While Iran has always maintained that its nuclear 
work was peaceful and that any nuclear programs undertaken were for 
civilian purposes,9 United States’ intelligence agencies suspected Iran 
of using the civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine 
nuclear weapons development.10  
In August 2002, an Iranian dissident group publicly revealed the 
existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water 
production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility.11 Following 
this revelation, in February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami acknowledged the existence of these facilities but argued 
that Iran undertook “small-scale enrichment experiments” to produce 
low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants.12 After the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors visited 
Natanz, and other sites, they concluded, in a May 2003 report, that 
Iran violated the terms of previous nuclear agreements.13 In June 
2003, Iran entered into diplomatic negotiations with France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom; the United States, however, 
refused to participate.14 These negotiations resulted in the Tehran 
Declaration in October 2003.15 The Declaration, signed by France,  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Iran Nuclear Talks: ‘Historic’ Agreement Struck, BBC NEWS (July 14, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33518524 
[http://perma.cc/5CLL-ZKXE].  
10. See Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear, supra note 4.  
11. Kate Lyons, Iran Nuclear Talks: Timeline, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 
3:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-
nuclear-talks-timeline [http://perma.cc/2FYB-H2QB]. 
12. Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear, supra note 4.  
13. Lyons, supra note 11. 
14. Lyons, supra note 11. 
15. Lyons, supra note 11. 
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Germany, the United Kingdom, and Iran, provided that Iran would 
cooperate fully with the IAEA and temporarily suspend all uranium 
enrichment.16 The Tehran Declaration was followed by the Paris 
Agreement in November 2004, according to which Iran agreed to 
temporarily suspend both enrichment and conversion activities, 
including the manufacture and operation of centrifuges.17  
The Paris Agreement fell apart after the election of hard-liner 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005.18 Iran notified the IAEA that 
it would resume uranium conversion and enrichment at several 
nuclear sites; prompting the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran 
to the Security Council.19 Between 2006 and 2010, the Security 
Council adopted six different resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear 
program; these resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment 
activities and imposed sanctions, including freezing the assets of 
certain Iranian individuals and companies.20  
In September 2009, President Obama, revealed the existence of an 
underground enrichment facility in Fordow and argued that “Iran’s 
decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the 
IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center 
of the non-proliferation regime.”21 The relationship between the 
United States and Iran remained stalled until March 2013, when the 
United States began a series of secret bilateral talks with Iranian 
officials in Oman.22 While public information about the nature of 
these talks has been largely unavailable, one can presume that the 
Obama Administration was hoping to establish more candid and 
forthcoming communication with Iranian leadership, paving the way 
for more formal nuclear disarmament negotiations after the Iranian 
 
16. Lyons, supra note 11. 
17. Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear, supra note 4. 
18. Stephen J. Hadley, Iran Primer: The George W. Bush Administration, 
PBS FRONTLINE (Nov. 3, 2010, 1:05 PM), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/11/iran-
primer-the-george-w-bush-administration.html [http://perma.cc/8BML-
JHXM]. 
19. Id.; Country Profiles: Iran: Nuclear, supra note 4; Lyons, supra note 11.  
20. Hadley, supra note 18.  
21. Jesse Lee, “A Growing Concern that Iran is Refusing to Live Up to 
Those International Responsibilities,” WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 25, 2009, 
11:39 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/09/25/a-growing-
concern-iran-refusing-live-those-international-responsibilities 
[http://perma.cc/KQQ4­E2BV]. 
22. Laura Rozen, Three Days in March: New Details on How U.S., Iran 
Opened Direct Talks, BACK CHANNEL (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2014/01/7484/three-
days-in-march-new-details-on-the-u-s-iran-backchannel/ 
[http://perma.cc/RS3W-6RXT]. 
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elections, which had been scheduled for June 2013.23 In June 2013, 
Hassan Rouhani, a more moderate and pragmatic politician, was 
elected president of Iran.24 In August 2013, three days after his 
inauguration, Rouhani called for a resumption of serious negotiations 
with the West on the Iranian nuclear program.25 In September 2013, 
Obama and Rouhani had a telephone conversation, the first high-level 
contact between the United States and Iranian leaders since 1979.26 
Additionally, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian foreign 
minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, signaling that the two countries 
had begun to negotiate and perhaps cooperate.27  
After several rounds of negotiations, an interim agreement on the 
Iranian nuclear program was signed on November 24, 2013, by the 
same actors that are currently parties to the Agreement: the United 
States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, the European Union, 
and Iran.28 The interim agreement—the Joint Plan of Action—was 
signed in Geneva, Switzerland.29 It provided for a short-term 
suspension of portions of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for 
decreased economic sanctions, as the countries continued to work 
toward a long-term agreement.30 The IAEA also began “more 
intrusive and frequent inspections” under this Interim agreement.31 
The interim agreement was formally implemented on January 20, 
2014.32  
 
23. Id. (noting that the talks “helped provide some basis [for 
understanding]…”). 
24. Lyons, supra note 11. 
25. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, 
available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-
Diplomacy-With-Iran [http://perma.cc/6BS2-MKMN] (last updated 
Oct. 2015). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Anne Gearan & Joby Warrick, World Powers Reach Nuclear Deal with 
Iran to Freeze Its Nuclear Program, WASH. POST (November 24, 
2013), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-
iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/8FLK-FA3E]. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 25. 
32. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 25. See also 
Fredrik Dahl & Justyna Pawlak, West, Iran Activate Landmark Nuclear 
Deal, REUTERS, (Jan. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/20/us-iran-nuclear-
idUSBREA0J00420140120 [http://perma.cc/7T5M-RLJ3]. 
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After the interim agreement was activated, all relevant parties 
agreed to continue their talks, with the goal of reaching a long-term 
agreement over the subsequent months.33 The parties reached an 
initial deal framework on April 2, 2015 in Lausanne, Switzerland; 
under this framework, Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions on 
its nuclear program for at least a decade, and to submit to an 
increased international inspections regime.34 The last set of 
contentious negotiations took place over the course of seventeen days 
in Vienna, in late June and July 2015, resulting in the current 
Agreement, signed on July 14, 2015 and based on the April 2, 2015 
framework.35 
III. Basics of the Agreement 
Under the terms of the Agreement, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear 
program in several ways. First, Iran agreed to decrease its stockpile of 
low-enriched uranium by 98 per cent; the Agreement contemplates 
that this reduction will remain in place for fifteen years.36 Moreover, 
during the same fifteen-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching 
uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian nuclear power 
and research, but not for building nuclear weapons.37 Second, Iran 
 
33. Louis Charbonneau & Fredrik Dahl, Iran Warned of ‘Last Chance’ in 
Nuclear Talks After Deadline Missed, REUTERS (July 19, 2014, 
1:20AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/19/us-iran-nuclear-
idUSKBN0FN27020140719 [http://perma.cc/HXD6-S7ML]. 
34. Lyons, supra note 11; Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, supra 
note 25; Eric Bradner, What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal? 7 Key Points, 
CNN POLITICS (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:56 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-main-points-
of-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/U6SZ-XTCU].  
35. During the negotiations, it is reported that U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry directly asked Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif 
to confirm that he was “authorized to actually make a deal, not just by 
the [Iranian] president, but by the supreme leader?” Zarif gave 
assurances that he was. Karen DeYoung and Carol Morello, The Path to 
a Final Iran Nuclear Deal: Long Days and Short Tempers, WASH. 
POST (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/long-days-
and-short-tempers-the-path-to-a-final-nuclear-
deal/2015/07/15/bb90235c-2b1d-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/KDV5­9F8V]; Lyons, supra note 11. 
36. Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear 
Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen With Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 
14, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-
deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/S2KM-9VQN].  
37. Peralta, supra note 3.  
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agreed to place over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage and to 
limit any enrichment capacity to only the Natanz plant, which will be 
monitored by the IAEA.38 This limitation will remain in place for ten 
years.39 Third, Iran agreed to refrain from building any new uranium-
enrichment facilities for fifteen years.40 Under the terms of the 
Agreement, Iran may continue research and development work on 
enrichment, but that work will be restricted to the Natanz facility 
and will be subject to enumerated limitations for the first eight 
years.41 Fourth, Iran agreed to cease enriching uranium at the Fordow 
facility for at least fifteen years; instead, the Fordow facility will be 
converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. Fordow, an 
underground facility, had been at the center of international anxiety 
because many believed that Iran was enriching uranium in centrifuges 
at this facility.42 Fifth, Iran will implement an Additional Protocol 
agreement, which will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran 
remains a party to the NPT. Iran’s acceptance of the Additional 
Protocol is particularly important, because it represents a 
continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions after the 
entire nuclear Agreement is implemented.43 Sixth, Iran agreed to a 
comprehensive inspection and verification regime by the IAEA. The 
IAEA will have continuous monitoring access to Iran’s declared 
nuclear sites, such as Natanz and Fordow.44 The IAEA inspection 
team will consist of 150 inspectors, which prior to the Agreement, the 
inspection team had comprised of only 50 inspectors. The Agreement 
also authorizes the IAEA to use various types of sophisticated 
monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic seals on equipment that 
can electronically send information to the IAEA, infrared satellite 
imagery to detect covert sites, environmental sensors that can detect 
minute signs of nuclear particles, tamper-resistant, radiation-resistant 
cameras, as well as computerized accounting programs to gather 
information and detect anomalies, and big data sets on Iranian 
imports, to monitor dual-use items.45 In addition to monitoring 
 
38. Gordon & Sanger, supra note 36; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
supra note 1.  
39. See sources cited supra note 38. 
40. Bradner, supra note 34. 
41. Peralta, supra note 3.  
42. Peralta, supra note 3. 
43. Factsheet: Iran and the Additional Protocol, CTR. ARMS CONTROL & 
NON-PROLIFERATION (July 14, 2015), available at 
http://armscontrolcenter.org/factsheet-iran-and-the-additional-protocol/ 
[perma.cc/7E3X-TD7F]. 
44. Peralta, supra note 3.  
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declared nuclear sites, IAEA inspectors will also be able to request 
access to non-declared nuclear facilities.46  
Experts estimate that under these restrictions Iran’s “break-out” 
time—the time needed to build a nuclear weapon –will increase from 
two to three months to an entire year.47 The estimated one year 
break-out time would remain in place for ten years, but could 
significantly decrease by the Agreement’s expiration date in fifteen 
years.48 Finally, the Agreement provides a dispute resolution 
procedure for when a party to the Agreement suspects that Iran is not 
complying with the terms of the Agreement. Ultimately, “[t]he deal 
lays out a scheme in which if there is a dispute about Iran meeting its 
obligations, the full U.N. Security Council would ‘vote on a resolution 
to continue the sanctions lifting.’”49 This is what the Obama 
Administration refers to as “snap-back” sanctions.50  
In exchange for its compliance with the Agreement, Iran will 
benefit from suspension and termination of various economic and 
nuclear sanctions. First, the Agreement contemplates that no new 
United Nations or European Union nuclear-related sanctions or 
 
45. Tim Mak, The Spy Tech That Will Keep Iran in Line, DAILY BEAST 
(July 6, 2015, 1:03 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/06/the-spy-tech-that-
will-keep-iran-in-line.html [perma.cc/XEF5-DVZ9]. 
46. Rebecca Kaplan, Obama says inspectors get access to “any” site in 
Iran. Is it true?, CBS NEWS (July 14, 2015, 10:40 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-inspectors-access-any-site-iran-
true/ [perma.cc/HFR9-QDXJ]. 
47. Gordon & Sanger, supra note 36, Bradner, supra note 34.  
48. See sources cited supra note 47. 
49. Peralta, supra note 3.  
50. For a detailed account of “snap-back” sanctions under the Agreement, 
see Ankit Panda, How the Iran Deal’s ‘Snap Back’ Mechanism Will 
Keep Tehran Compliant, DIPLOMAT (July 15, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/how-the-iran-deals-snap-back-
mechanism-will-keep-tehran-compliant/ [perma.cc/7HJZ-NYXP](“if any 
of the signatories of the JCPOA have any reason to believe that another 
party is not upholding its commitments under the agreement….they can 
refer the issue to a Joint Commission for resolution. If a non-Iran party 
raises an issue with the commission and isn’t too happy with the 
result…..it can notify the UN Security Council. The Security Council has 
30 days to make a move, i.e. adopt a resolution on the specific issue at 
hand. Where the United States preserved unique leverage–and immunity 
from a Russian or Chinese veto against resuming old UN Security 
Council sanctions–is the next step. If the Security Council doesn’t act in 
30 days, all of the pre-JCPOA nuclear-related sanctions on Iran come 
back into place automatically. Basically, the U.S. and the EU states in 
the P5+1 can veto ongoing sanctions relief but Russia and China can’t 
veto a return to the status quo ante.”).  
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restrictive measures will be imposed.51 After the IAEA issues a report 
verifying Iran’s implementation of the nuclear-related measures, the 
United Nations’ sanctions against Iran will terminate, and some 
European Union sanctions will terminate or be suspended.52 Moreover, 
the United States promised to stop imposing nuclear-related sanctions 
against Iran at some point in the first half of 2016.53 Most importantly 
for Iran, once these various sanctions are lifted, Iran will be positioned 
to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas 
banks.54 Sanctions for ballistic missile technologies will remain in place 
for another eight years, and similar sanctions on conventional weapon 
sales will remain for five years.55 However, all other United States 
sanctions against Iran relating to human rights abuses, missiles, and 
support for terrorism will not be affected by the Agreement, and will 
likely remain in place.56 These sanctions are deemed to be more 
stringent because many have so-called extra-territorial effect and 
apply worldwide.  
IV. (Dis)Advantages of the Agreement 
The most important advantages of the Iran Nuclear Agreement, if 
successfully implemented, are that Iran’s break-out time will be 
augmented to one year, and that Iran will be subject to various 
inspections and verification programs by the international community 
over the next fifteen years.57 While some argue that the Agreement 
only postpones Iran’s ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon by 
fifteen years, others emphasize that this result is nonetheless more 
advantageous than the pre-Agreement situation, where Iran may have 
 
51. Jessica Simeone & Anup Kaphle, Here Are The Highlights Of The Iran 
Nuclear Agreement, BUZZFEEDNEWS (July 14, 2015, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicasimeone/here-are-the-highlights-of-the-
iran-nuclear-agreement#.tnWp81VQl [perma.cc/YW2V-CGQM]. 
52. Explainer: The Iran nuclear deal, EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. 
(July 17, 2015), available at 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/iran_explainer3070 [perma.cc/SRF5-NCUH]. 
53. Id. 
54. Jackie Northam, Lifting Sanctions Will Release $100 Billion To Iran. 
Then What?, NPR (July 16, 2015, 3:53 PM) available at 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/07/16/423562391/lifting-
sanctions-will-release-100-billion-to-iran-then-what [perma.cc/MCT7-
J4PY]. 
55. Gordon & Sanger, supra note 36. 
56. Felicia Schwartz, When Sanctions Lift, Iranian Commander Will 
Benefit, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/15/when-sanctions-lift-iranian-
commander-will-benefit/ [perma.cc/49P9-3PMZ]. 
57. See supra Part III. 
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been just months shy of having a nuclear arm. Moreover, it is entirely 
plausible that Iran will cease the production of nuclear weapons 
altogether and indefinitely, in light of ongoing inspections and 
verifications imposed by the Agreement, and encouraged by the lifting 
of various international sanctions as a result of compliance. In 
addition, many in the international community believe that the most 
important feature of the Iran Nuclear Agreement is that Iran will, 
once again, become re-engaged in the international arena. Because the 
Agreement provides for the lifting of various economic sanctions that 
crippled Iran’s economy for decades, Iran has every incentive to 
comply with the terms of the Agreement and to attempt to rebuild 
not just its economy, but also a reputation as a non-rogue world 
player. Reports hail the deal, writing that “One of the most 
important implications of the comprehensive nuclear agreement 
between Tehran and the great powers is the renewed faith in the 
power of diplomacy.”58 
The clearest disadvantage of the Agreement is its limited 
duration. As discussed above, most inspections and limitations on 
Iran’s nuclear program will cease after the first fifteen years, and most 
experts concede that Iran’s break-out time will return to its current 
two-three month frame.59 Additionally, the Agreement contains 
several provisions that the United States and its allies may view as 
concessions or mini “victories” for Iran. For example, the Agreement 
allows Iran to continue enriching uranium for non-military purposes.60 
This provision can be interpreted as giving Iran approval to maintain 
a small-scale nuclear program. Critics of the deal have pointed out 
that the Agreement does not dismantle Iran’s nuclear program 
altogether, and that Iran could, in fifteen years, resume operating a 
larger military-purpose oriented nuclear production.61 Moreover, under 
the terms of the Agreement, IAEA inspectors will have continuous 
access to declared nuclear sites, but will have to ask Iran’s permission 
to visit any non-declared sites. Iran will not be required to grant 
access for several weeks, which may enable it to hide and remove any 
forbidden nuclear production items.62 Finally, critics of the deal have 
 
58. Richard Javad Heydarian, Iran nuclear deal is a triumph of diplomacy, 
ALJAZEERA (Aug. 8, 2015, 8:07 GMT), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/iran-nuclear-deal-
triumph-diplomacy-150726121334719.html [perma.cc/B3TB-KQXV]. 
59. For a detailed discussion of the Agreement’s duration, see supra Part 
III. 
60. See, e.g., Peralta, supra note 3.  
61. See Peralta, supra note 3 (even President Obama has conceded that, at 
the expiration of the Agreement in 15 years, Iran’s break-out time could 
return to zero).  
62. See supra Part III.  
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emphasized that snap-back sanctions, which would be re-imposed on 
Iran if it violates the terms of the Agreement, are not automatic.63 In 
fact, under the terms of the Agreement, a party to the Agreement 
may refer a potential violation thereof to the Security Council, which 
will have thirty days to adopt a resolution to continue the lifting of 
sanctions. If such a resolution is not adopted within thirty days, then 
pre-Agreement nuclear sanctions would automatically be re-imposed.64 
The effect of this rule is that any permanent member of the Security 
Council (the U.S., Britain, China, Russia and France) can veto any 
ongoing sanctions relief, but no member can veto the re-imposition of 
sanctions.65 Moreover, Iran has stated that in such a case, it would 
cease performing its nuclear obligations under the Agreement. Critics 
of the Agreement have argued that because the Agreement provides 
that Iran could treat reinstatement of sanctions (in part or entirely) 
as grounds for leaving the agreement, the United States and other 
parties to the Agreement will be reluctant to impose “snap-back” 
sanctions for smaller violations. One critic remarked, “the only thing 
you’ll take to the Security Council are massive Iranian violations, 
because you’re certainly not going to risk the Iranians walking away 
from the deal and engaging in nuclear escalation over smaller 
violations.”66 
The International Community has widely accepted the Agreement 
with all its relative advantages and disadvantages.67 In the United 
States, however, it remains to be seen whether President Obama will 
be able to persuade the American Congress and public on the merits 
of this now infamous Agreement.  
V. Post-Agreement: Implementation and Obama’s 
Legacy? 
The Security Council and the European Union approved the 
Agreement; moreover, President Obama signed the Agreement as an 
 
63. See Karoun Demirjian, Twelve things in the Iran deal that lawmakers 
can’t agree on, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/issues-with-iran-deal/ 
[perma.cc/485R-H2SQ] (providing a detailed discussion of disagreements 
between those who support and oppose the Agreement). 
64. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1 at ¶ 36.  
65. See Panda, supra note 50.  
66. Michele Kelemen, A Look At How Sanctions Would ‘Snap Back’ If Iran 
Violates Nuke Deal, NPR (July 20, 2015, 5:16 AM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/20/424571368/if-iran-violates-nuke-deal-a-
look-at-how-sanctions-would-snap-back [perma.cc/BDG8-6YF6] (quoting 
Mark Dubowitz, sanctions expert at the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, which has been campaigning against the Agreement). 
67. See infra Part V. 
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Executive Act.68 However, under a recently passed federal statute, so-
called Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,69 Congress may pass a 
resolution approving or disapproving the Agreement within sixty-
days.70 If the United States Congress disapproves the Agreement, 
 
68. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Moves to Lift Iran Sanctions After Nuclear 
Deal, Setting Up a Clash in Congress, N. Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/security-
council-following-iran-nuclear-pact-votes-to-lift-sanctions.html?_r=0 
[perma.cc/8L6F-SJEW] (reporting that the Security Council voted 15-0 
to adopt a resolution approving the Agreement, and that on the same 
day, the European Union also confirmed the Agreement); Amber 
Phillips, Can Congress stop the Iran deal?, WASH. POST (July 14, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/07/09/the-role-of-congress-or-lack-thereof-in-the-iran-deal-
explained/ [perma.cc/SA4G-MKFA] (noting that the Agreement is an 
executive act and discussing the difference between formal treaties, 
requiring a two-thirds congressional approval, and executive agreements 
which the president can sign on his or her own). In United States’ 
constitutional history, there is ample precedent for the legality of 
signing agreements in the form of executive acts or agreements. In 2003, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi that “our cases have recognized that the President has 
authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring 
no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having 
been exercised since the early years of the Republic. See American 
Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). Although 
some criticized the form of the Agreement, arguing that it should be 
considered a treaty rather than an executive agreement, other 
prominent commentators disagree. See Lee A. Casey, The Lawless 
Underpinnings of the Iran Nuclear Deal, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2015, 
A13 (arguing that the Agreement should have been considered a treaty 
requiring two-thirds approval by both houses of congress). But see Jack 
Goldsmith, More Weak Arguments For The Illegality of the Iran Deal, 
LAWFARE BLOG (July 27, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-
weak-arguments-illegality-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/R9VR-RXEE] 
(calling arguments for the illegality of the agreement “weak”); John 
Yoo, Why Obama’s Executive Action on Iran Does Not Violate the Law, 
NAT’L REV. (July 26, 2015), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421621/iran-deal-constition-
supports-obama-executive-action [https://perma.cc/P2XT-BNVZ] 
(arguing that the executive agreement form of the Agreement is 
consistent with the Treaty Clause of the Constitution). 
69. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–17. 
§2, 129 Stat. 201 (42 §  2160e) (legislative history shows the act was an 
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and passed by the Senate 
as S. 615 on May 7, 2015, in a 98-1 vote. It was passed by the House as 
H.R. 1191 on May 14, 2015, in a 400-25 vote, and it was approved by 
President Obama on May 22, 2015.). 
70. See Phillips, supra note 68 (noting that the Nuclear Agreement Review 
Act was passed as a compromise between President Obama and 
Congress, and that the Act gives Congress the ability to review any 
agreement signed with Iran). 
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President Obama will most certainly veto Congressional disapproval. 
Congress will need a vote by two-thirds of both houses of Congress to 
override President Obama’s veto.71 Because it is extremely unlikely 
that Congress will be able to override the presidential veto, it is 
highly probable that the Agreement will become part of American 
law. As such, this Agreement may constitute the hallmark of 
President Obama’s diplomatic efforts and achievements.  
In urging Congress to approve the Agreement, President Obama 
stated; “If we don’t choose wisely, I believe future generations will 
judge us harshly, for letting this moment slip away.”72 The legacy of 
the Obama presidency may lie in this diplomatic achievement—Iran’s 
re-engagement in the international arena and the end of worldwide 
speculations that the Iranian rogue regime was secretly building a 
nuclear weapon. President Obama himself has argued that the success 
of this Agreement should not be assessed by whether the Iranian 
regime is ultimately transformed, but by the more modest goal of the 
Agreement, which was to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 
However, it may be that the Obama legacy, in terms of foreign 
relations with Iran, will depend on this Agreement’s ability to steer 
Iran toward a more democratic form of governance.73 As Thomas 
Friedman recently opined, “I suspect [President Obama’s] legacy on 
this issue will ultimately be determined by whether the deal does, in 
the long run, help transform Iran, defuse the U.S.-Iran Cold War and 
curtail the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East — not foster 
their proliferation.” Only time will tell whether President Obama was 
correct in steering the nation toward the Agreement. His legacy will, 
in many ways, depend on the shrewdness of this particular political 
calculus.  
VI. Conclusion 
In defending the Agreement, President Obama argued “this deal 
will make America and the world safer and more secure.”74 The  
71. Phillips, supra note 68. 
72. Gardiner Harris & Michael D. Shear, Obama Begins 60-Day Campaign 
to Win Over Iran Deal Skeptics at Home and Abroad, N. Y. TIMES 
(July 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-
deal-approval-urged-by-obama.html [https://perma.cc/F3GM-SM7R]. 
73. Thomas L. Friedman, Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal, N. 
Y. TIMES (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-obama-
makes-his-case-on-iran-nuclear-deal.html [perma.cc/8FER-D9YS]. 
74. Office Press Sec’y, WEEKLY ADDRESS: A Comprehensive, Long-Term 
Deal with Iran (July 18, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/18/weekly-
address-comprehensive-long-term-deal-iran [perma.cc/SZL8-T4HB]). 
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Agreement, which curbs Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons 
over the next fifteen years, may lead to global safety, peace in the 
Middle East, and nuclear non-proliferation. If this proves to be true, 
the Agreement would constitute President Obama’s most significant 
foreign policy achievement and would be viewed as a cornerstone of 
his legacy.  
 
